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ABSTRACT
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved tremendous success
in various fields; however, training these models from scratch could
be computationally expensive and requires a lot of training data.
Recent work has explored different watermarking techniques to
protect the pre-trained deep neural networks from potential copy-
right infringements. Although several existing techniques could
effectively embed such watermarks into the DNNs, they could be
vulnerable to adversaries who aim at removing the watermarks.
In this work, we propose REFIT, a unified watermark removal
framework based on fine-tuning, which does not rely on the knowl-
edge of the watermarks and even the watermarking schemes. Firstly,
contrary to previous work suggesting that fine-tuning based ap-
proaches are not effective at removing the watermarks, we demon-
strate that by properly designing the learning rate schedule for
fine-tuning, such approaches could be effective instead.
Furthermore, we conduct a comprehensive study of a realis-
tic attack scenario where the adversary has limited training data,
which has not been emphasized in prior work on attacks against
watermarking schemes. To effectively remove the watermarks with-
out compromising the model functionality under this weak threat
model, we propose two techniques that are incorporated into our
fine-tuning framework: (1) an adaption of the elastic weight consoli-
dation (EWC) algorithm, which is originally proposed for mitigating
the catastrophic forgetting phenomenon; and (2) unlabeled data
augmentation (AU), where we leverage auxiliary unlabeled data
from other sources. Our extensive evaluation on different bench-
marks shows the effectiveness of REFIT against diverse watermark
embedding schemes. In particular, both EWC and AU significantly
decrease the amount of labeled training data needed for effective
watermark removal, and the unlabeled data samples used for AU do
not necessarily need to be drawn from the same distribution as the
benign data for model evaluation. The experimental results demon-
strate that our fine-tuning based watermark removal attacks could
pose real threats to the copyright of pre-trained models, and thus
highlight the importance of further investigation of the watermark-
ing problem and proposing more robust watermark embedding
schemes against the attacks.
Preprint, work in progress, 2020.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved great performance
on a variety of application domains, and are creating tremendous
business values [12, 24, 52]. Building these models from scratch
is computationally intensive and requires the access to a large set
of high-quality and carefully annotated training samples. Various
online marketplaces, such as BigML and Amazon, have emerged to
allow people to buy and sell the pre-trained models. Just like other
commodity softwares, the intellectual property (IP) embodied in
DNNs needs proper protection in order to preserve competitive
advantage of the model owner.
To protect the intellectual property of pre-trainedDNNs, awidely
adopted approach is watermarking [1, 43, 50, 56]. A common para-
digm of watermarking is to inject some specially-designed training
samples, so that the model could be trained to predict in the ways
specified by the owner when the watermark samples are fed into
the model. In this way, a legitimate model owner can train the
model with watermarks embedded, and distribute it to the model
users. When he later encounters a model he suspects to be a copy of
his own, he can verify the ownership by inputting the watermarks
to the model and checking the model predictions. This approach
has gained a lot of popularity due to the simplicity of its protocol.
On the other hand, recent work has studied attack approaches
to bypass the watermark verification process, so that the legitimate
model owner is not able to claim the ownership. To achieve this
goal, there are two lines of work in the literature. One line of work
studies detection attacks against watermark verification [26, 39].
Specifically, when the input is suspected to be a watermark by
the detection mechanism, the model returns a random prediction,
otherwise it returns the true model prediction. Another line of
work that attracts more interest is on watermark removal attacks,
which aims at modifying the watermarked models so that they no
longer predict in the ways specified by the model owner when pro-
vided with the watermark samples. In particular, most of existing
work assumes the knowledge of the watermarking scheme, e.g.,
the approach is specifically designed for pattern-based watermarks,
where each of the watermark samples is blended with the same pat-
tern [6, 16, 22, 51]. Although there are some latest works studying
general-purpose watermark removal schemes that are agnostic to
watermark embedding approaches, including pruning [32, 39, 56],
distillation [53], and fine-pruning [32], most of these attacks either
significantly hamper the model accuracy in order to remove the wa-
termarks, or are conducted with the assumption that the adversary
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has full access to the data used to train the watermarked model. The
lack of investigation into data efficiency leaves it unclear whether
such watermark removal attacks are practical in the real world.
In this paper, we propose REFIT as a general-purpose water-
mark removal framework based on fine-tuning. Although previous
work suggests that fine-tuning alone is not sufficient to remove
the watermarks [1, 32], we find that by carefully designing the
fine-tuning learning rate schedule, the adversary is able to remove
the watermarks instead. However, when the adversary only has
access to a small training set that is not comparable to the dataset
for pre-training, although the watermarks can still be removed,
the test accuracy could also degrade. Therefore, we propose two
techniques to overcome the challenge of lacking in-distribution
training data. The first technique is adapted from elastic weight
consolidation (EWC) [28], which is originally proposed to mitigate
the catastrophic forgetting phenomenon, i.e., the model tends to
forget the knowledge learned from old tasks when later trained on
a new one [18, 27, 28]. The central idea behind this component is
to slow down learning on model weights that are relevant to the
knowledge learned for the task of interest, and keep updating other
weights that were used more for memorizing watermarks.
Another technique is called unlabeled data augmentation (AU).
While a large amount of labeled data could be expensive to col-
lect, unlabeled data is much cheaper to obtain; e.g., the adversary
can simply download as many images as he wants from the Inter-
net. Therefore, the adversary could leverage inherently unbounded
provision of unlabeled samples during fine-tuning. Specifically, we
propose to utilize the watermarked model to annotate the unlabeled
samples, and augment the fine-tuning training data with them.
We perform a systematic study of REFIT, where we evaluate
the attack performance when varying the amount of data the ad-
versary has access to. We focus on watermark removal of deep
neural networks for image recognition in our evaluation, where ex-
isting watermarking techniques are shown to be the most effective.
To demonstrate that REFIT is designed to be agnostic to different
watermarking schemes, we evaluate our watermark removal perfor-
mance over a diverse set of watermark embedding approaches, and
on both transfer learning and non-transfer learning. For transfer
learning setting, we demonstrate that after fine-tuning with RE-
FIT, the resulted models consistently surpass the test performance
of the pre-trained watermarked models, sometimes even when
neither EWC nor AU is applied, while the watermarks are success-
fully removed. For non-transfer learning setting with very limited
in-distribution training set, it becomes challenging for the basic
version of REFIT to achieve a comparable test performance to the
pre-trained watermarked model. With the incorporation of EWC
and AU, REFIT significantly decreases the amount of in-distribution
labeled samples required for preserving the model performance
while the watermarks are effectively removed. Furthermore, the
unlabeled data could be drawn from a very different distribution
than the data for evaluation; e.g., the label sets could barely overlap.
To summarize, we make the following contributions.
• In contrast to the previous observation of the ineffective-
ness of fine-tuning based watermark removal schemes, we
demonstrate that with an appropriately designed learning
rate schedule, fine-tuning is able to effectively remove the
watermarks.
• We propose REFIT, a watermark removal framework that is
agnostic to different types of watermark embedding schemes.
In particular, to deal with the challenge of lacking in-distribution
labeled fine-tuning data, we develop two techniques, i.e., an
adaption of elastic weight consolidation (EWC) and aug-
mentation of unlabeled data (AU), towards mitigating this
problem from different perspectives.
• We perform the first comprehensive study of data efficiency
of watermark removal attacks, where we demonstrate the ef-
fectiveness of REFIT against diverse watermarking schemes.
Our work provides the first successful demonstration of water-
mark removal techniques against different watermark embedding
schemes when the adversary has limited data, which poses real
threats to existing watermark embedding schemes. We hope that
our extensive study could shed some light on the potential vulnera-
bility of existing watermarking techniques in the real world, and
encourage further investigation of designing more robust water-
mark embedding approaches.
2 WATERMARKING FOR DEEP NEURAL
NETWORKS
In this work, we study the watermarking problem following the
formulation in [1]. Specifically, a model owner trains a model fθ
for a certain task T . Besides training on a dataset drawn from the
data distribution of T , the owner also embeds a set of watermarks
K = {(xk ,yk )}Kk=1 into fθ . A valid watermarking scheme should
at least satisfy two properties:
• Functionality-preserving, i.e., embedding these watermarks
does not noticeably degrade the model performance on T .
• Verifiability, i.e., for (xk ,yk ) ∈ K , Pr (fθ (xk ) = yk ) ≫
Pr (f ′(xk ) = yk ), where f ′ is any other model that is not
trained with the purpose of embedding the same set of wa-
termarks. In practice, the model owner often sets a threshold
γ , so that when Pr ( fˆ (xk ) = yk ) > γ , the model fˆ is con-
sidered to have the watermarks embedded, which could be
used as an evidence to claim the ownership. We refer to γ as
the watermark decision threshold.
Various watermark embedding schemes have been proposed in
recent years [1, 7, 21, 36, 39, 56], and we defer more detailed discus-
sion to Section 4. Among all the existing watermarking schemes,
the most widely studied ones could be pattern-based techniques,
which blend the same pattern into a set of images as the water-
marks [1, 7, 21]. Such techniques are also commonly applied for
backdoor injection or Trojan attacks [33, 34, 44]. Therefore, a long
line of work has studied defense proposals against pattern-based
watermarks [6, 16, 22, 51]. Despite that these defense methods are
shown to be effective against at least some types of pattern-based
watermarks, they typically rely on certain assumptions of the pat-
tern size, label distribution, etc. More importantly, it would be hard
to directly apply these methods to remove other types of water-
marks, which limits their generalizability. In contrast to this line
of work, we study the threat model where the adversary has the
minimal knowledge of the pre-training process, as detailed below.
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2.1 Threat Model for Watermark Removal
In this work, we assume the following threat model for the adver-
sary who aims at removing the watermarks. In Figure 1, we provide
an overview to illustrate the setup of watermark embedding and
removal, as well as the threat model.
No knowledge of the watermarks. Some prior work on detect-
ing samples generated by pattern-based techniques requires the
access to the entire data for pre-training, including the water-
marks [5, 49]. In contrast, we do not assume the access to wa-
termarks for pre-training.
Noknowledge of thewatermarking scheme.As discussed above,
most prior works demonstrating successful watermark removal rely
on the assumption that the watermarks are pattern-based [6, 16, 22,
51]. In this work, we study fine-tuning as a generic and effective
approach to watermark removal, without the knowledge of the
watermarking scheme.
Limited data for fine-tuning.We assume that the adversary has
computation resources for fine-tuning, and this assumption is also
made in previous work studying fine-tuning and distillation-based
approaches for watermark removal [1, 32, 53, 56]. Note that most
prior works along this line assume that the adversary has access
to the same amount of benign data for task T as the model owner.
While this is a good starting point, this assumption does not always
hold in reality. Specifically, when the adversary has a sufficiently
large dataset to train a good model, he is generally less motivated
to take the risk of conducting watermark removal attacks, given
that he is already able to train his own model from scratch.
To study the watermark removal problem with a more realistic
threat model, in this work, we perform a comprehensive study of the
scenarios where the adversary has a much smaller dataset for fine-
tuning than the pre-training dataset. In this case, training a model
from scratch with such a limited dataset would typically result
in an inferior performance, as we will demonstrate in Section 5,
which provides the adversary with sufficient incentives to pirate a
pre-trained model and invalidate its watermarks.
3 REFIT: REMOVINGWATERMARKS VIA
FINE-TUNING
In this section, we present REFIT, a unified watermark removal
framework based on fine-tuning. We present an overview of the
framework in Figure 2, and we will discuss the technical details
in the later part of the section. The central intuition behind this
scheme stems from the catastrophic forgetting phenomenon of ma-
chine learning models, that is, when a model is trained on a se-
ries of tasks, such a model could easily forget how to perform the
previously trained tasks after training on a new task [18, 27, 28].
Accordingly, when the adversary further trains the model with his
own data during the fine-tuning process, since the fine-tuning data
no longer includes the watermark samples, the model should forget
the previously learned watermark behavior.
Contrary to this intuition, some prior works show that exist-
ing watermarking techniques are robust against fine-tuning based
techniques, even if the adversary fine-tunes the entire model and
has access to the same benign data as the owner, i.e., the entire
data for pre-training excluding the watermark samples [1, 32, 56].
The key reason could be that the fine-tuning learning rates set in
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Figure 1: An overview of our problem setup of watermark
embedding and removal, as well as the threat model. Specif-
ically, the model owner embeds a set of watermark samples
into the pre-trained model, so that these samples could be
used for ownership verification later. Meanwhile, the train-
ing data accessible to the adversary is too limited to train a
model of good performance from scratch, which motivates
the adversary to pirate a pre-trained model. To bypass the
ownership verification, the adversary needs to remove the
watermarks, so that the watermark accuracy does not trig-
ger the threshold γ .
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Figure 2: An overview of our proposed REFIT framework.
Specifically, besides the basic fine-tuning scheme, REFIT in-
corporates two techniques to address the challenge when
the adversary has limited amount of in-distribution labeled
data, i.e., elastic weight consolidation (EWC) and augmenta-
tion with unlabeled data (AU).
these work are too small to change the model weights with a small
number of training epochs. To confirm this hypothesis, we first
replicate the experiments in [1] to embed watermarks into models
trained on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 respectively. Afterwards, we
fine-tune the models in a similar way as their FTAL process, i.e., we
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update the weights of all layers. The only change is that instead of
setting a small learning rate for fine-tuning, which is 0.001 in their
evaluation, we vary the magnitude of the learning rate to see its
effect. Specifically, starting from 1e-5, the learning rate is doubled
every 20 epochs in the fine-tuning process, which is the number of
fine-tuning epochs for watermark removal in their evaluation.
Figure 3 presents the training curve of this fine-tuning process.
We can observe that the change of model performance is still negli-
gible when the learning rate is around 0.001, becomes noticeable
when it reaches around 0.005, and requires a larger value to reach
a sufficiently low watermark accuracy. Meanwhile, at the begin-
ning of each epoch when the learning rate is doubled, the training
and test accuracies decrease first, then gradually improve within
the next 20 epochs; on the other hand, the watermark accuracy
keeps decreasing, since the watermarks are not included in the
fine-tuning dataset. Inspired by this observation, although the ad-
versary does not have knowledge of the watermarks, he can set the
initial fine-tuning learning rate so that it considerably degrades the
training and test accuracies within the first few fine-tuning steps,
which suggests that the model weights are sufficiently modified
to remove the watermarks; on the other hand, the initial learning
rate still enables the model to achieve a desirable test performance
when the fine-tuning converges, since setting the learning rate too
large would result in a model not much different from one trained
from scratch. In Section 5, we demonstrate that with a learning rate
schedule designed in this way, the adversary is able to remove the
watermarks without compromising the model performance when
he has access to a large amount of labeled training data.
While this initial attempt of watermark removal is promising,
this basic fine-tuning scheme is inadequatewhen the adversary does
not have training data comparable to the owner of the watermarked
model. For example, when the adversary only has 20% of the CIFAR-
100 training set, to ensure that the watermarks are removed, the test
accuracy of the fine-tuned model could degrade by 5%. This is again
due to the catastrophic forgetting: when we fine-tune the model to
forget its predictions on watermark set, the model also forgets part
of the normal training samples drawn from the same distribution as
the test one. Although the decrease of the test accuracy is in general
much less significant than watermark accuracy, such degradation
is still considerable, which could hurt the utility of the model.
There have been some attempts to mitigate the catastrophic
forgetting phenomenon in the literature [10, 13, 17, 28]. However,
most techniques are not directly applicable to our setting. In fact,
during the watermark embedding stage, the model is jointly trained
on two tasks: (1) to achieve a good performance on a task of in-
terest, e.g., image classification on CIFAR-10; (2) to remember the
labels of images in the watermark set. Contrary to previous study
of catastrophic forgetting, which aims at preserving the model’s
predictions on all tasks it has been trained, our goal of watermark
removal is two-fold, i.e., minimizing the model’s memorization on
the watermark task, while still preserving the performance on the
main task it is evaluated on. This conflict results in the largest dif-
ference between our watermark removal task and the continual
learning setting studied in previous work.
Another important difference is that although the training data
of the adversary is different from the pre-trained data, the fine-
tuning dataset contributes to a sub-task of the pre-trained model,
Figure 3: Training curves to illustrate the effect of learning
rate during the fine-tuning stage, using 20% of the labeled
training data. At the beginning, the model is pre-trained
with the watermark scheme in [1]. Starting from a fine-
tuning learning rate of 1e-5, the learning rate is doubled ev-
ery 20 epochs. We can observe that the watermark accuracy
is considerably decreased only when the learning rate is ap-
propriately large. See Figure 9 in the appendix for the corre-
sponding plots where the model is fine-tuned on the entire
training set, by which we can draw similar conclusions.
while getting rid of the watermarks. On the other hand, different
tasks are often complementary with each other in previous stud-
ies of catastrophic forgetting. This key observation enables us to
adapt elastic weight consolidation [28], a regularization technique
proposed to mitigate catastrophic forgetting issue, for our purpose
of watermark removal.
ElasticWeight Consolidation (EWC). The central motivation of
EWC is to slow down the learning of parameters that are important
for previously trained tasks [28]. To measure the contribution of
each model parameter to a task, EWC first computes the Fisher
information matrix of the previous task as follows:
Fi = Ex∼D,y∼fθ ∗ (y |x )
[
∂ log fθ (y |x)
∂θi
2
θ=θ ∗
]
(1)
where fθ ∗ (y |x) is the probability distribution obtained by applying
the softmax to output logits of the model with parameters θ∗ given
an input x , and D is the training dataset of the previous task.
Intuitively, in order to prevent the model from forgetting prior
tasks when learning a new task, the learned parameter θ should be
close to the parameterθ∗ of prior tasks, when the newly coming data
also contains information relevant to θ∗. Algorithmically, we should
penalize the distance between θi and θ∗i when the i-th diagonal
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entry of the Fisher information matrix is large. Specifically, EWC
adds a regularization term into the loss function for training on a
new task, i.e.,
LEWC (θ ) = Lbasic (θ ) +
λ
2
∑
i
Fi
(
θi − θ∗i
)2 (2)
where Lbasic (θ ) is the loss to optimize the performance on the
new task (e.g. a cross entropy loss); λ controls the strength of the
regularization, indicating the importance of memorizing old tasks;
θ∗ is the parameters trained with the previous task; F is the Fisher
information matrix associated with fθ ∗ , and Fi is the diagonal entry
corresponding to the i-th parameter.
We can further extend this idea to the transfer learning setting,
when the fine-tuning data belongs to a different task from the
pre-trained one. In this case, the adversary can first fine-tune the
pre-trained watermarked model with a small learning rate, which
results in a model for his new task, although the watermarks usually
still exist. Afterwards, the adversary can treat the model parameters
of this new model as θ∗, and plug in Equation 1 correspondingly.
Notice that since we do not have access to the pre-trained data,
in principle we are not able to compute the Fisher information
matrix of the previous task, thus cannot calculate the regularization
term in LEWC (θ ). However, by leveraging the assumption that the
fine-tuning data is drawn from a similar distribution to the pre-
trained data, we can instead approximate the Fishermatrix using the
fine-tuning data. Given that the fine-tuning data does not include
watermarks, the EWC component enables the model to update less
on model weights important for achieving a good test accuracy,
while the model weights important for watermark memorization
are still sufficiently modified. Although the approximation could be
imprecise in this way, in Section 5, we will show that this technique
enables the adversary to improve the test performance of the model
with limited data, while the watermarks are successfully removed.
With the same goal of preserving the test performance of the
model with watermarks removed, we propose data augmentation
with unlabeled data, which further decreases the amount of in-
distribution labeled training samples needed for this purpose.
Augmentation with Unlabeled data (AU). We propose to aug-
ment the fine-tuning data with unlabeled samples, which could
easily be collected from the Internet. LetU = {xu }Uu=1 be the unla-
beled sample set, we use the pre-trained model as the labeling tool,
i.e., yu = fθ (xu ) for each xu ∈ U. We have tried more advanced
semi-supervised techniques to utilize the unlabeled data, e.g., virtual
adversarial training [37] and entropy minimization [20], but none
of them provides a significant gain compared to the aforementioned
simple labeling approach. Therefore, unless otherwise specified, we
use this method for our evaluation of unlabeled data augmentation.
Similar to our discussion of extending EWC to transfer learning,
we can also apply this technique to the transfer learning setting by
first fine-tuning the model for the new task without considering
watermark removal, then using this model for labeling.
Since the test accuracy of the pre-trained model is not 100% itself,
such label annotation is inherently noisy; in particular, whenU is
drawn from a different distribution than the task of consideration,
the assigned labels may not be meaningful at all. Nevertheless, in
Section 5, we will show that leveraging unlabeled data significantly
decreases the in-distribution labeled samples needed for effective
watermark removal, while preserving the model performance.
4 EVALUATION SETUP
In this section, we introduce the benchmarks and the watermark
embedding schemes used in our evaluation, and discuss the details
of our experimental configurations.
4.1 Datasets
We evaluate on CIFAR-10 [30], CIFAR-100 [30], STL-10 [9] and
ImageNet32 [8], which are popular benchmarks for image classifi-
cation, and some of them have been widely used in previous work
on watermarking [1, 39, 56].
CIFAR-10. CIFAR-10 includes coloured images of 10 classes, where
each of them has 5,000 images for training, and 1,000 images for
testing. Each image is of size 32×32. Figure 4 shows somewatermark
examples generated based on images in CIFAR-10.
CIFAR-100. CIFAR-100 includes coloured images of 100 classes,
where each of them has 500 images for training, and 100 images
for testing, thus the total number of training samples is the same
as CIFAR-10. The size of each image is also 32 × 32.
STL-10. STL-10 has been widely used to evaluate the transfer learn-
ing, semi-supervised and unsupervised learning algorithms, fea-
tured with a large amount of unlabeled samples. Specifically, STL-10
consists of 10 labels, where each label has 500 training samples and
800 test samples. Besides the labeled samples, STL-10 also provides
100,000 unlabeled images drawn from a similar but broader dis-
tribution of images, i.e., they include images of labels that do not
belong to the label set of STL-10. The size of each image is 96 × 96,
which is much larger than CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. Although the
label set of STL-10 largely overlaps with the label set of CIFAR-
10, the images of the same label from the two datasets are clearly
distinguishable, even if resizing them to the same size.
ImageNet32. ImageNet32 is a downsampled version of the Ima-
geNet dataset [11]. Specifically, ImageNet32 includes all samples
in the training and validation sets of the original ImageNet, except
that the images are resized to 32×32. Same as the original ImageNet,
this dataset has 1.28 million training samples of 1000 labels, and
50,000 samples with 50 images per class for validation.
4.2 Watermarking Techniques
To demonstrate the effectiveness of REFIT against various water-
mark embedding schemes, we evaluate pattern-based techniques [7,
21, 56], embedding samples drawn from other data sources as the
watermarks [1, 7, 56], exponential weighting [39], and adversarial
frontier stitching [36]. These techniques represent the typical ap-
proaches of watermark embedding studied in the literature, and are
shown to be the most effective ones against watermark removal.
Pattern-based techniques (Pattern). A pattern-based technique
specifies a key pattern key and a target label yt , so that for any
image x blended with the pattern key, Pr (fθ (x) = yt ) is high. To
achieve this, the owner generates a set of images {xk }Kk=1 blended
with key, assigns yk = yt (k ∈ 1, ...,K), then adds {(xk ,yk )}Kk=1
into the training set. Figure 4 shows some watermark samples
generated by pattern-based techniques. Pattern-based techniques
are also commonly used for embedding backdoors into the pre-
trained model [7, 21, 33].
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Out-of-distribution watermark embedding (OOD). A line of
work has studied using images drawn from other data sources than
the original training set as the watermarks. Figure 5 presents some
watermarks used in [1], where each watermark image is indepen-
dently randomly assigned with a label, thus different watermarks
can have different labels. We can observe that these images are very
different from the samples in any benchmark we evaluate on, and
do not belong to any category in the label set.
Exponential weighting (EW). Compared to the above water-
marking techniques, the scheme in [39] introduces two main differ-
ent design choices. The first choice is about the watermark sample
generation. Specifically, they generate the watermarks by changing
the labels of some training samples to different random labels, but
do not modify the images themselves. The main motivation behind
this idea is to defend against the detection attacks mentioned in
Section 1, i.e., an adversary who steals the model could use an out-
lier detection scheme to detect input images that are far from the
data distribution of interest, and returns a random prediction for
such images, so as to bypass the watermark verification of those
techniques using out-of-distribution images as the watermarks.
The second choice is about the embedding method. Instead of
jointly training the model on both normal training set and the
watermark set, they decompose the training process into three
stages. They first train the model on the normal training set only.
Afterwards, they add an exponential weight operator over each
model parameter. Specifically, for parameters in the l-th layer of
the model denoted as θ l , EW (θ l ,T )i = exp
θ li T 
maxj exp
θ ljT θ li , where T is
a hyper-parameter for adjusting the intensity of weighting. Finally,
the model with exponential weighting scheme is further trained on
both normal training data and watermark set.
Although this watermarking scheme could be less vulnerable
against certain attacks, especially the detection attacks against
watermark verification, we will demonstrate that this approach
does not provide superior robustness against REFIT.
Adversarial frontier stitching (AFS). In [36], they propose to use
images added with the adversarial perturbation as the watermarks.
Specifically, themodel is first trained on the normal training set only.
Afterwards, they generate a watermark set that is made up of 50%
true adversaries, i.e., adversarially perturbed images that the model
provides the wrong predictions, and 50% false adversaries, i.e., ad-
versarially perturbed images on which the model still predicts the
correct labels. The adversarial perturbations are computed using the
fast gradient sign method [19], i.e., xadv = x + ϵ · siдn(∇x J (θ ,x ,y)),
where J (θ ,x ,y) is the training loss function of the model, and ϵ con-
trols the scale of the perturbation. Each of these images is annotated
with the ground truth label of its unperturbed counterpart as its
watermark label, i.e., the label of xadv is y, no matter whether it is
a true adversary or false adversary. Finally, the model is fine-tuned
with these watermarks added into the training set. See Figure 6 for
examples of watermarks generated by this technique.
4.3 Attack Scenarios
We consider the following attack scenarios in our evaluation.
Non-transfer learning. The adversary leverages a watermarked
model that is pre-trained for the same task aswhat adversary desires.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4: Examples of watermarks generated by the pattern-
based technique in [56]. Specifically, after an image is
blendedwith the “TEST” pattern in (a), such an image is clas-
sified as the target label, e.g., an “automobile” on CIFAR-10.
(a) (b)
Figure 5: Examples of watermarks generated by the out-of-
distribution watermark embedding technique in [1]. Differ-
ent watermarks could have different assigned labels.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 6: Examples of watermarks generated by the expo-
nential weighting technique in [39], and the adversarial
frontier stitching technique in [36]. Specifically, (a) and
(c) are generated by the exponential weighting technique,
which are images from the ImageNet32 training set, but as-
signed with random labels different from the ground truth;
for example, the watermark label of (a) is “trash can”. On
the other hand, (b) and (d) are generated by the adversar-
ial frontier stitching technique, which add adversarial per-
turbations over (a) and (c) respectively, but keep the ground
truth classes as their watermark labels; for example, the wa-
termark label of (b) is still “dog”.
For this scenario, we conduct experiments on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100,
and ImageNet32. For CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, the watermarked
model is pre-trained on its entire training set; while for ImageNet32,
the pre-trained model uses images of labels less than 500 in the
training set. To simulate the scenario where the adversary can
only collect a relatively small number of labeled training samples
drawn from a similar distribution to the data for pre-training, we
vary the proportion of training samples the adversary has access to
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compared to the entire training set, but in practice the fine-tuning
training dataset does not necessarily need to be a subset of the
pre-training dataset. We consider two data sources with abundant
images for unlabeled data augmentation: (1) the unlabeled part
of STL-10, which includes 100,000 samples; (2) for classification
on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, we also use the entire ImageNet32
for unlabeled data augmentation. For classification on ImageNet32,
only those training samples with labels larger than 500 are included
for unlabeled data augmentation. In both cases, we discard the
labels of these ImageNet32 samples, and only use the images for
augmentation. Note that these unlabeled images are very different
from the labeled data. In particular, the label sets between CIFAR-
100 and STL-10 barely overlap, and the label set of ImageNet32 is
much more fine-grained than CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100.
Transfer learning. The adversary leverages a watermarked model
pre-trained for a different task from what adversary desires. For
this scenario, our evaluation is centered on achieving a good per-
formance on STL-10. Note that the labeled part of STL-10 only
includes 5,000 samples, which is insufficient for training a model
with a high accuracy. Therefore, an adversary can leverage the
pre-trained model on another task with a larger training set, then
fine-tune the model on STL-10. This fine-tuning method is widely
adopted for transfer learning [54], and is also evaluated in [1]. In
particular, we perform the transfer learning to adapt from a model
trained on CIFAR-10 or ImageNet32 to STL-10. We do not consider
CIFAR-100 in this setting, because we find that adapting from a pre-
trained CIFAR-100 model results in inferior performance on STL-10
compared to CIFAR-10 and ImageNet32, e.g., the accuracy on STL-
10 is around 5% lower than the model pre-trained on CIFAR-10, as
presented in [1]. We perform the unlabeled data augmentation in
the same way as the non-transfer learning setting.
4.4 Implementation Details
Watermarking schemes.Our configuration ofwatermarking schemes
largely follows the same setups as their original papers, and we tune
the hyper-parameters to ensure that the pre-trained model achieves
100% watermark accuracy for each scheme. We directly use their
open-source implementation when applicable. Specifically:
• Pattern-based techniques.We use the text pattern in [56], and
Figure 4 presents some examples of generated watermarks.
• OOD watermark techniques. The watermark images are from
the code repository of [1] 1. The watermark set contains
100 individual images with labels randomly drawn from the
entire label set, and Figure 5 shows some examples.
• Exponential weighting. We set T = 2.0 as in [39]. For each
dataset, we use the last 100 samples from training set to form
the watermark set, and ensure that these watermark samples
are never included in the fine-tuning training set.
• Adversarial frontier stitching.We set ϵ so that the watermark
accuracy of a model trained without watermarks is around
50%. The values of ϵ are 0.15, 0.10 and 0.05 for CIFAR-10,
CIFAR-100 and ImageNet32 respectively.
Watermark removal techniques.We always fine-tune the entire
model for REFIT, because we find that fine-tuning the output layer
only is insufficient for watermark removal, as demonstrated in [1];
1https://github.com/adiyoss/WatermarkNN
and moreover, it will completely fail to remove watermarks in the
transfer learning setting by design. We have tried both FTAL and
RTAL processes in [1]. Specifically, FTAL directly fine-tunes the
entire model; when using RTAL, the output layer is randomly initial-
ized before fine-tuning. For non-transfer learning, we apply FTAL
method, as RTAL does not provide additional performance gain;
for transfer learning, we apply RTAL method, since the label sets of
the pre-trained and fine-tuning datasets are different. We observe
that as long as the pre-trained model achieves a high test accuracy
and fits the watermarks well, the model architecture does not have
critical influence on the effectiveness of watermark embedding and
removal. Thus, unless otherwise specified, we mainly apply the
ResNet-18 model [24] in our evaluation, which is able to achieve
competitive performance on all benchmarks in our evaluation.
As discussed in Section 3, the failure of previous attempts of fine-
tuning based watermark removal is mainly due to the improper
design of learning rate schedule during the fine-tuning stage. For ex-
ample, the initial learning rate for fine-tuning is 0.001 in [1], which
is 100× smaller than the initial learning rate for pre-training. In our
evaluation, we set the initial fine-tuning learning rate to be much
larger, e.g., 0.05. We used SGD as the optimizer, and set the batch
size to be 100 for both pre-training and fine-tuning without unla-
beled data, following the setup in [1]. We fine-tune the model until
the training accuracy does not further improve, which is typically
within 20 epochs, as in [1]. For unlabeled data augmentation, when
there is no in-distribution labeled samples, each batch includes 100
unlabeled samples. When fine-tuning on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and
STL-10, we decay the learning rate by 0.9 every 500 steps. When
fine-tuning on partial ImageNet32, the learning rate is multiplied
by 0.9t after training on t10 -fraction of the entire training set. More
discussion on implementation details can be found in Appendix A.
In Section 5, we denote this basic version of REFIT without EWC
and AU as Basic.
For our EWC component, Fisher information is approximated
by drawingM samples from in-distribution labeled data available
to the adversary. Unless otherwise specified, we set M = 10, 000
when the target domain is CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 or STL-10, and
M = 40, 000 when the target domain is ImageNet32. Notice that the
samples are drawn with replacement, soM can be larger than the
number of training examples available, where the same example
may be used for multiple times. In practice, to improve the stability
of the optimization, we first normalize the Fisher matrix Fi so that
its maximum entry is 1, then clip the matrix by 1λ ·lr before plugging
it into Equation (2), where lr is the learning rate.
In addition, we also compare with two baseline methods de-
noted as FS, which train the entire model from scratch, so that
the model is guaranteed to have a watermark accuracy no higher
than the decision threshold, though the test accuracy is typically
sub-optimal, especially when the training data is limited. The basic
version simply trains on the dataset available for fine-tuning, with-
out leveraging the pre-trained model. The second variant, denoted
as AU, applies the pre-trained model as the labeling tool in the
same way as the AU module in REFIT, but the model is randomly
initialized instead of initializing from the pre-trained model.
Evaluation metrics.We mainly consider the two metrics below.
• Watermark accuracy. The adversary needs to make sure that
the model accuracy on the watermark set is no more than the
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watermark decision threshold γ . In particular, we set γ to be
within the range of watermark accuracies of models trained
without watermarks. Specifically, for watermark schemes
other than AFS, we set γ to be 20% for CIFAR-10, 10% for
CIFAR-100, and 3% for ImageNet32. We set γ = 58% for all
benchmarks when using AFS, following [36].
Notice that for transfer learning setting, due to the differ-
ence of the label sets between the pre-trained and fine-tuning
tasks, the embedded watermarks naturally do not apply to
the new model. To measure the watermark accuracy, follow-
ing [1], we replace the output layer of the fine-tuned model
with the original output layer of the pre-trained model.
• Test accuracy. The adversary’s goal is to maximize the model
accuracy on the normal test set, while removing the water-
marks. We consider the top-1 accuracy in our evaluation.
Regarding the presentation of evaluation results in the next sec-
tion, unless otherwise specified, we only present the test accuracies
of the models. The watermark accuracy of the pre-trained model
embedded with any watermarking scheme in our evaluation is
100%, and the watermark accuracy of the model after watermark
removal using REFIT is always below the threshold γ .
5 EVALUATION
In this section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of REFIT to re-
move watermarks embedded by several different schemes, in both
transfer and non-transfer learning scenarios discussed in the previ-
ous section. We first present the overall results, then discuss related
ablation studies for comparison with existing work, as long as the
justification of our design choices.
5.1 Evaluation of transfer learning
We first present the results of transfer learning from CIFAR-10 to
STL-10 in Table 1. For comparison of the STL-10 test accuracy, we
also fine-tune the pre-trainedmodel with a smaller learning rate, e.g.
0.001, thus its watermark accuracy may remain above 70%, as in [1].
We observe that with the basic version of REFIT, where neither
EWC nor AU is applied, removing watermarks already does not
compromise the model performance on the testset. When equipped
with either EWC or AU, the model fine-tuned with REFIT even
surpasses the performance of the watermarked model.
Then we present the results of transferring ImageNet32 to STL-
10 in Table 2. We observe that using the pre-trained models on
ImageNet32 yields around 10% improvement of test accuracy com-
pared to the ones pre-trained on CIFAR-10, although the label set
of ImageNet32 is much more different from STL-10 than CIFAR-
10. This could attribute to the diversity of samples in ImageNet32,
which makes it a desirable data source for pre-training. Different
from pre-training on CIFAR-10, the basic version of REFIT no longer
suffices to preserve the test accuracy. By leveraging the unlabeled
part of STL-10, the model performance becomes comparable to
the watermarked ones. When combining EWC and AU, the perfor-
mance of fine-tuned models dominate among different variants of
REFIT as well as the watermarked models.
Meanwhile, when we train the STL-10 from scratch and only
use the pre-trained model as the labeling tool, the performance of
models fine-tuned on unlabeled part of STL-10 is consistently better
than models using ImageNet32 for unlabeled data augmentation.
This is expected, since the unlabeled part of STL-10 is closer to
the test distribution than ImageNet32. Interestingly, we find that
by integrating AU into REFIT, the gap between utilizing STL-10
and ImageNet32 for unlabeled data augmentation is significantly
shrunk, which indicates the effectiveness of our overall framework.
5.2 Evaluation of non-transfer learning
For non-transfer learning setting, to begin with, we present results
on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 in Table 3 and 4 respectively. First, we
observe that when the adversary has 80% of the entire training set,
using the basic version of REFIT already achieves higher test accu-
racies than the pre-trained models using any watermarking scheme
in our evaluation, while removing the watermarks. Note that the
watermark accuracies are still above 95% using the fine-tuning ap-
proaches in previous work [1, 56], suggesting the effectiveness of
our modification of the fine-tuning learning rate schedule.
However, when the adversary only has a small proportion of
labeled training set, the test accuracy could degrade. Although the
test accuracy typically drops for about 2% on CIFAR-10 even if
the adversary has only 20% of the entire training set, the accuracy
degradation could be up to 5% on CIFAR-100. For all watermarking
schemes other than AFS, incorporating the EWC component typi-
cally brings in an accuracy improvement of nearly 1% on CIFAR-10,
and up to 3% on CIFAR-100, which are significant considering the
performance gap to the pre-trained models. The improvement for
AFS is smaller yet sill considerable, partially because the perfor-
mance of the basic fine-tuning is already much better than other
watermarking schemes, which suggests that AFS could be more
vulnerable to watermark removal, at least when the labeled data is
very limited. By leveraging the unlabeled data, the adversary is able
to achieve the same level of test performance as the pre-trained
models with only 20% ∼ 30% of the entire training set. We skip the
results of combining EWC and AU on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100,
since they are generally very close to the results of AU. However,
we will demonstrate that the combination of EWC and AU provides
observable performance improvement on ImageNet32, which is a
more challenging benchmark.
Furthermore, unlabeled data augmentation enables the adversary
to fine-tune the model without any labeled training data, and by
solely relying on the unlabeled data, the accuracy of the fine-tuned
model could be within 1% difference from the pre-trained model
on both CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, and sometimes even surpasses
the performance of the model trained with 80% data from scratch.
Note that both STL-10 and ImageNet32 images are drawn from
very different distributions than CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100; when
we only apply AU alone and train the model from scratch, the model
accuracies are even worse than the basic version of REFIT. Specifi-
cally, augmenting with STL-10 provides better results on CIFAR-10,
partially because the label set of CIFAR-10 overlaps much more
with STL-10 than ImageNet32; on the other hand, augmenting with
ImageNet32 shows clearly better performance on CIFAR-100, which
may result from its higher diversity that is necessary for CIFAR-100
classification. However, when integrating AU into REFIT, we ob-
serve that the choice of unlabeled data does not play an important
rule in the final performance; i.e., the performance of augmenting
with one data source is not always better than the other. These
results show that REFIT is effective without the requirement that
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FS REFIT
Basic AU Basic EWC AU
Pattern
66.15%
75.28%/74.01% 82.96% 83.76% 83.80%/84.36%
OOD 74.69%/74.59% 82.83% 83.90% 83.51%/83.40%
EW 75.51%/74.48% 84.03% 84.66% 84.43%/84.07%
AFS 75.23%/73.95% 83.66% 84.39% 84.39%/83.80%
Table 1: Test accuracies of models on STL-10 after
watermark removal in the transfer learning setting,
where the models are pre-trained on CIFAR-10. The
accuracies of fine-tuned models on STL-10 with no re-
quirement for watermark removal are 82.06%, 82.89%,
84.03% and 83.66% for Pattern, OOD, EW and AFS re-
spectively. For AU, x%/y% stand for the results of aug-
menting with STL-10 and ImageNet32 respectively.
FS REFIT
Basic AU Basic EWC AU EWC+AU
Pattern
66.15%
74.76%/71.50% 88.89% 91.14% 92.30%/90.78% 93.31%/92.99%
OOD 75.63%/72.50% 90.39% 92.03% 92.74%/91.96% 92.94%/92.45%
EW 75.56%/72.36% 91.01% 91.68% 92.11%/91.41% 92.46%/92.34%
AFS 75.19%/72.71% 92.46% 92.63% 92.63%/92.51% 92.96%/92.65%
Table 2: Test accuracies of models on STL-10 after wa-
termark removal in the transfer learning setting, where
the models are pre-trained on ImageNet32. The accura-
cies of fine-tunedmodels on STL-10with no requirement
for watermark removal are 92.95%, 92.39%, 92.16%, and
92.46% for Pattern, OOD, EW and AFS respectively. For
AU, x%/y% stand for the results of augmenting with STL-
10 and ImageNet32 respectively.
Pct. FS REFITBasic AU Basic EWC AU
Pattern
0% − 89.86%/88.43% − − 92.53%/91.93%
20% 87.40% 91.32%/90.91% 92.12% 92.90% 92.80%/92.78%
30% 89.64% 92.13%/91.49% 92.22% 93.02% 93.15%/92.88%
40% 90.46% 92.46%/92.15% 92.93% 93.25% 93.18%/93.03%
50% 91.45% 92.47%/92.25% 93.08% 93.25% 93.18%/93.13%
80% 93.01% 92.82%/92.67% 93.52% 93.67% 94.11%/93.43%
OOD
0% − 90.13%/88.01% − − 90.48%/87.52%
20% 87.40% 91.15%/90.87% 91.19% 91.85% 92.41%/92.08%
30% 89.64% 91.67%/91.58% 91.58% 92.58% 93.01%/92.61%
40% 90.46% 92.11%/91.92% 92.76% 93.20% 93.21%/92.58%
50% 91.45% 92.48%/92.29% 92.97% 93.37% 93.21%/92.66%
80% 93.01% 92.81%/92.66% 93.93% 93.85% 94.00%/93.26%
EW
0% − 89.77%/89.11% − − 93.05%/93.22%
20% 87.40% 91.58%/90.99% 91.65% 92.46% 93.30%/93.34%
30% 89.64% 91.69%/91.69% 92.30% 93.29% 93.50%/93.39%
40% 90.46% 92.35%/91.92% 92.83% 93.27% 93.34%/93.42%
50% 91.45% 92.44%/92.31% 93.39% 93.39% 93.51%/93.36%
80% 93.01% 92.97%/93.03% 93.95% 94.05% 93.61%/93.42%
AFS
0% − 90.05%/79.47% − − 91.60%/85.68%
20% 87.40% 91.52%/89.07% 92.85% 92.95% 93.09%/92.72%
30% 89.64% 92.09%/90.02% 93.16% 93.40% 93.09%/93.01%
40% 90.46% 92.23%/91.15% 93.21% 93.37% 93.20%/93.09%
50% 91.45% 92.58%/91.83% 93.12% 93.56% 93.19%/93.42%
80% 93.01% 92.93%/92.69% 93.69% 93.80% 93.65%/93.76%
Table 3: Results of non-transfer learning setting on
CIFAR-10. The first column is the percentage of
CIFAR-10 training set used for fine-tuning, and the
rest columns show the accuracy on the testset. The test
accuracy of the pre-trainedmodel is 93.23% for Pattern,
93.63% for OOD, 93.49% for EW, and 93.31% for AFS. For
AU, x%/y% stand for the results of augmenting with
STL-10 and ImageNet32 respectively.
Pct. FS REFITBasic AU Basic EWC AU
Pattern
0% − 58.07%/62.44% − − 70.75%/68.27%
20% 56.72% 67.28%/68.12% 68.88% 71.80% 71.97%/72.06%
30% 62.20% 68.95%/70.07% 71.05% 72.64% 72.98%/72.73%
40% 65.42% 70.45%/71.34% 71.96% 73.20% 73.44%/73.39%
50% 68.18% 71.27%/72.23% 72.58% 73.44% 73.72%/73.84%
80% 71.71% 73.22%/73.79% 74.23% 74.77% 75.42%/74.09%
OOD
0% − 57.22%/61.11% − − 65.98%/66.79%
20% 56.72% 67.18%/67.75% 68.55% 69.91% 71.02%/71.00%
30% 62.20% 68.83%/70.06% 70.12% 71.77% 71.70%/72.25%
40% 65.42% 70.44%/71.10% 70.80% 72.57% 72.20%/72.40%
50% 68.18% 71.37%/72.17% 72.27% 72.73% 72.73%/73.11%
80% 71.71% 72.65%/73.00% 73.61% 74.00% 73.70%/73.18%
EW
0% − 55.79%/64.35% − − 71.78%/73.41%
20% 56.72% 67.66%/68.57% 69.00% 70.63% 73.48%/73.34%
30% 62.20% 69.01%/70.71% 71.37% 72.13% 73.72%/74.08%
40% 65.42% 70.72%/71.30% 72.64% 73.27% 74.21%/74.34%
50% 68.18% 71.96%/72.38% 73.46% 74.25% 74.26%/75.07%
80% 71.71% 73.70%/73.56% 74.98% 75.18% 75.09%/74.84%
AFS
0% − 57.47%/64.89% − − 69.92%/68.64%
20% 56.72% 67.22%/67.81% 71.16% 71.46% 71.67%/71.58%
30% 62.20% 69.30%/69.40% 71.73% 72.20% 72.28%/72.02%
40% 65.42% 70.74%/71.31% 72.62% 73.33% 72.86%/72.72%
50% 68.18% 72.00%/72.20% 73.01% 73.41% 73.11%/73.26%
80% 71.71% 72.71%/73.01% 73.56% 74.10% 73.14%/74.00%
Table 4: Results of non-transfer learning setting on
CIFAR-100. The first column is the percentage of CIFAR-
100 training set used for fine-tuning, and the rest
columns show the accuracy on the testset. The test accu-
racy of the pre-trainedmodel is 73.83% for Pattern, 73.37%
forOOD, 74.95% for EW, and 73.14% forAFS. ForAU, x%/y%
stand for the results of augmenting with STL-10 and Im-
ageNet32 respectively.
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Pct. FS REFITBasic AU Basic EWC AU EWC + AU
Pattern
0% − 21.77% − − 54.37%
10% 36.06% 39.41% 51.05% 53.59% 55.98% 56.81%
20% 42.53% 48.34% 54.76% 56.35% 58.06% 58.75%
30% 47.83% 52.76% 56.87% 58.40% 58.62% 59.40%
40% 51.70% 55.24% 57.82% 59.09% 59.24% 59.71%
50% 53.58% 57.04% 58.76% 59.68% 59.40% 60.02%
OOD
0% − 21.46% − − 51.68%
10% 36.06% 39.32% 50.76% 52.02% 53.87% 55.16%
20% 42.53% 48.30% 53.05% 54.64% 55.92% 57.04%
30% 47.83% 52.58% 55.47% 56.42% 57.63% 58.27%
40% 51.70% 55.34% 56.60% 57.41% 58.17% 58.44%
50% 53.58% 56.87% 57.86% 58.50% 58.51% 59.12%
EW
0% − 23.56% − − 52.76%
10% 36.06% 39.70% 49.69% 52.44% 54.58% 55.68%
20% 42.53% 48.16% 53.65% 55.89% 56.10% 56.94%
30% 47.83% 52.26% 55.54% 56.25% 57.12% 57.23%
40% 51.70% 55.32% 56.36% 57.00% 57.28% 57.40%
50% 53.58% 56.90% 57.30% 57.68% 57.66% 57.80%
AFS
0% − 20.12% − − 50.22%
10% 36.06% 39.22% 50.27% 51.05% 53.52% 53.72%
20% 42.53% 48.20% 52.95% 54.03% 56.00% 56.50%
30% 47.83% 52.64% 55.21% 56.31% 57.02% 57.40%
40% 51.70% 55.28% 57.43% 57.57% 57.90% 57.94%
50% 53.58% 57.28% 57.88% 58.52% 58.02% 58.83%
Table 5: Results of non-transfer learning setting on Ima-
geNet32. The first column is the percentage of training set
used for fine-tuning, and the rest columns show the test
accuracy. Note that the percentage is with respect to the
training samples of the first 500 classes in ImageNet32. The
test accuracy of the pre-trained model is 60.26% for Pattern,
60.04% for OOD, 58.31% for EM, and 59.60% for AFS. The re-
ported test accuracy ismeasured on only the first 500 classes
of ImageNet32. For AU, the unlabeled images are obtained
from the last 500 classes of ImageNet32.
the unlabeled data comes from the same distribution as the task
of evaluation, which makes it a practical watermark removal tech-
nique for the adversary given its simplicity and efficacy, thus poses
real threats to the robustness of watermark embedding schemes.
In addition, we notice that while AU mostly dominates when the
percentage of labeled data is very small, with a moderate percentage
of labeled data for fine-tuning, e.g., around 40%, EWC starts to
outperform AU in some cases. In particular, on CIFAR-10, EWC
consistently exceed AU when 30% labeled data is available to the
adversary, and the corresponding percentage is 40% on CIFAR-
100. This indicates that with the increase of the labeled data, the
estimated Fisher matrix could better capture the important model
parameters to preserve for adversary’s task.
In Table 5, we further present our results on ImageNet32. Com-
pared to the results on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, removing water-
marks embedded into pre-trained ImageNet32 models could result
in a larger decrease of test accuracy, which is expected given that
ImageNet32 is a more challenging benchmark with a much larger
label set. Despite facing with more challenges, we demonstrate that
by combining EWC and AU, REFIT is still able to reach the same
level of performance as the pre-trained watermarked model with
50% of the labeled training data.
Meanwhile, the increased difficulty of this benchmark also en-
ables us to better analyze the importance of each component in
REFIT, i.e., EWC and AU. In particular, each of the two components
offers a decent improvement of the test performance. The increase
of accuracy with EWC is around 1% − 3% over the basic version
when the fine-tuning data is very limited, e.g., the percentage of
labeled samples is 20%. The performance of using AU is generally
better than using EWC, until the labeled training set includes 50%
of the ImageNet32 training samples of the first 500 classes, when
EWC becomes more competitive. Finally, including both EWC and
AU always enables further improvement of the test performance,
suggesting that the combined technique is advantageous for chal-
lenging tasks.
Comparing the results of different watermarking schemes, we
can notice that the models fine-tuned from pre-trained models em-
bedded with pattern-based watermarks consistently beat the test
accuracy of models embedded with other watermarks, suggesting
that while pattern-based watermarking techniques are generally
more often used than other approaches, especially for backdoor in-
jection, such watermarks could be easier to remove, which makes it
necessary to propose more advanced backdoor injection techniques
that are robust to removal attacks.
5.3 Discussion of sample efficiency
In the following, we provide some discussion about the sample
efficiency of EWC and AU components in REFIT.
The number of samplesM for EWC. For EWC component, we
investigate how the number of samplesM drawn for Fisher infor-
mation approximation affects the performance, and present the
results in Figure 7. Specifically, we evaluate on CIFAR-100, and
embed the pre-trained models with pattern-based watermarks. We
observe that with only M = 100 samples, EWC is already able to
increase the test accuracy around 1% over the basic fine-tuning,
demonstrating its effectiveness of preserving the test performance.
Setting a higher M may further improve the results, but it could
also introduce a higher computation overhead without significant
performance gain when M becomes too large. Therefore, we set
the default value ofM based on such a trade-off.
The number of unlabeled samples for AU. For AU component,
we demonstrate the results of varying the number of unlabeled
samples for fine-tuning in Figure 8. We also evaluate on CIFAR-100
with the pre-trained model using the pattern-based watermarking
scheme, and the unlabeled samples are drawn from the unlabeled
part of STL-10. Despite the large difference of dataset distribu-
tion between STL-10 and CIFAR-100, augmenting with 5K unla-
beled samples already enables a considerable performance gain,
and the test accuracy continues to increase with more unlabeled
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Figure 7: Results of differentM for EWC, where we perform
4 runs for eachM , and plot themean and standard deviation.
The pre-trained models are embedded with pattern-based
watermarks, and fine-tuned with partial CIFAR-100.
Figure 8: Results of different number of unlabeled sam-
ples for AU, where we perform 4 runs for each setting, and
plot the mean and standard deviation. The pre-trained mod-
els are embedded with pattern-based watermarks, and fine-
tuned with partial CIFAR-100. The unlabeled samples for
augmentation are drawn from the unlabeled part of STL-10.
samples, suggesting the promise of leveraging unlabeled data for
watermark removal, which is typically much easier to collect than
in-distribution labeled data.
5.4 Comparison with alternative watermark
removal attacks
In the following, we provide some discussion and comparison with
some general-purpose watermark removal approaches proposed in
previous work, which also does not assume the knowledge of the
watermarking scheme.
Discussion of distillation attacks. Distillation is a process to
transform the knowledge extracted from a pre-trained model into
a smaller model, while preserving the prediction accuracy of the
smaller model so that it is comparable to the pre-trained one [25].
Specifically, a probability vector is computed asp(x)i = exp(f (x )i /T )∑
j exp(f (x )j /T ) ,
where f (x) is the output logit of the model f given the input x , and
T is a hyper-parameter representing the temperature. Afterwards,
instead of using the one-hot vector of the ground truth label for
each training sample x , the extracted p(x) from the pre-trained
model is fed into the smaller model as the ground truth. Previous
work has proposed distillation as a defense against adversarial ex-
amples [41, 42]. Meanwhile, a recent work studies distillation as an
attack against watermark embedding approaches, and suggests its
effectiveness [53]. However, in order to preserve the test accuracy,
such attacks rely on an assumption that the adversary has abundant
data for fine-tuning, which is not the case in our setup. Therefore,
the direct application of distillation attacks is inappropriate.
Alternatively, we investigate incorporating this technique into
our unlabeled data augmentation process. Specifically, for the unla-
beled part of data, instead of using the one-hot encoding of labels
predicted by the pre-trained model, we use p(x) as the ground truth
label, and vary the value of T to see the effect. Nevertheless, this
method does not provide a better performance; for example, with
20% labeled training set on CIFAR-10 and using unlabeled part of
STL-10 for augmentation, when the pre-trained model is embedded
with OOD watermarks, setting T = 1 provides the test accuracy of
91.60%, while using the one-hot label results in 91.93% test accuracy
as in Table 3, and setting other values ofT do not cause any signifi-
cant difference. In particular, we observe that when using output
logits of the watermarked model as the ground truth for fine-tuning,
the resulted model tends to have a higher watermark accuracy, per-
haps because while the output logits allows the fine-tuned model to
better fit to the pre-trained model, it also encourages the fine-tuned
model to learn more information of watermarks. Thus, we stick to
our original design to annotate the unlabeled data.
Comparison with fine-pruning. Previous work found that al-
though pruning-based approaches themselves are largely ineffec-
tive [32, 39, 56], combining such techniques with fine-tuning could
improve the effectiveness of watermark removal [32]. Therefore, we
compare with the fine-pruning method proposed in [32], which first
prunes part of the neurons that are activated the least for benign
samples, and then performs the fine-tuning. We set the pruning
rates before fine-tuning in the same way as their paper, i.e., keep
increasing the pruning rate stepwise, and stop when the degrade
of the model performance becomes observable, and we apply the
same fine-tuning learning rate schedule as REFIT.
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Dataset Model Pruning Before fine-tuning Percentage20% 30% 40% 50% 80%
CIFAR-10
ResNet-18 ◦ 90.72%(65%) 91.10% 92.05% 92.72% 93.25% 94.20%× 93.73%(100%) 90.82% 92.27% 92.78% 93.44% 94.03%
VGG-16 ◦ 64.69%(77%) 90.21% 91.44% 92.00% 92.81% 93.52%× 93.48%(100%) 89.94% 91.53% 92.59% 92.69% 93.35%
CIFAR-100
ResNet-18 ◦ 53.34%(71%) 67.34% 70.25% 71.42% 72.80% 74.05%× 74.50%(100%) 67.83% 70.54% 72.16% 72.49% 74.74%
VGG-16 ◦ 63.26%(97%) 62.03% 65.44% 67.72% 68.49% 70.99%× 72.19%(100%) 62.80% 65.65% 68.11% 69.47% 71.38%
Table 6: Comparison between the basic version of REFIT and fine-pruning [32], where × in the column “Pruning” denotes
REFIT without EWC and AU, and ◦ denotes fine-pruning. The pre-trained models are embedded with OOD watermarks. For
results before fine-tuning, we also present the watermark accuracies in the brackets. In the columns of “Percentage”, we
present the proportion of labeled training set used for fine-tuning. For fine-pruning, the ratio of the pruned neurons from the
last convolution layer are 98.4% and 85.9% for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, respectively.
Table 6 presents the results on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, compar-
ing the fine-pruning approach to the basic version of REFIT without
EWC and AU, where the pre-trained models are embedded with
OODwatermarks. Besides ResNet-18, we also evaluate VGG-16 [47],
another neural network architecture that is capable of achieving
the same level of performance on both CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100.
For both datasets and model architectures, we find that the results
are roughly similar, suggest that pruning is not necessary with a
properly designed learning rate schedule for fine-tuning.
6 RELATEDWORK
Aside from the attacks that infringe the intellectual property of a
machine learning model, a variety of attacks have been proposed
against machine learning models, which aim at either manipulating
model predictions [21, 44, 48], or revealing sensitive information
from trained models [14, 15, 23, 46]. We will also provide a review of
work on catastrophic forgetting phenomenon in deep learning, as
it inspires the use of EWC loss for our watermark removal scheme.
Backdoor attacks. In the context of machine learning, backdoor at-
tacks manipulate the model to provide the desired predictions spec-
ified by the adversary on inputs associated with the backdoor key.
In this sense, backdoor attacks are closely connected to watermarks
in their formats, but usually with difference purposes, as discussed
in [1]. Previous work have shown that deep neural networks are
vulnerable to backdoor attacks [7, 21]. Accordingly, several defense
methods have been proposed for backdoor attacks [6, 16, 22, 51].
Poisoning attacks. Similar to watermarking techniques and back-
door attacks, poisoning attacks also inject well-crafted data into
training set in order to alter the predictive performance of a deep
neural network. Depending on whether they aim at degrading the
test accuracy indiscriminately or pertaining to specific examples,
data poisoning attacks can be categorized into untargeted and tar-
geted ones. Untargeted poisoning attacks have been studied for
various types of machine learning models, such as support vector
machines [3], Bayes classifiers [40], collaborative filtering [31], and
deep neural networks [29, 38, 44]. Since targeted attacks only affect
the test performance on a small set of examples but do not render
the entire machine learning system useless, they are less detectable
and thus arguably more dangerous than untargeted ones.
Evasion attacks. In contrast to poisoning attacks, evasion attacks
are launched in the test time of a machine learning model. The
resulted samples are called adversarial examples, which are visu-
ally similar to normal data but lead to wrong predictions by the
model [2, 48]. Existing adversarial example generation algorithms
mainly rely on the gradient information. For instance, the fast gra-
dient sign method (FGSM) has been proposed to add perturbations
along the gradient directions [19]; the projected gradient descent
method takes the gradient for multiple steps, winding up a more
powerful attack. Prior work also proposes to formulate an opti-
mizaion problem so as to search for the adversarial examples with
minimal perturbation [4]. Note that the FGSM method is used to
generate watermark samples for the AFS watermarking scheme.
Catastrophic forgetting. Catastrophic forgetting refers to the
phenomenon that a neural network model tends to underperform
on old tasks when it is trained sequentially on multiple tasks. This
occurs because the weights in the network that are important for
an old task are changed to meet the objectives of a new task. Many
recent approaches have been proposed against this effect, such as
adjusting weights [28, 55], and adding data of past tasks to the new
task training [35, 45]. In particular, elastic weight consolidation
algorithm is a classic way of mitigating catastrophic forgetting via
adapting the learning of specific weights to their importance to pre-
vious tasks [28]. Note that the original EWC algorithm requires the
access to the data used for learning old tasks, which is not available
in our case. Therefore, we propose an adaption of the algorithm to
make it suitable for our watermark removal application.
7 CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose REFIT, a unified framework that removes
the watermarks via fine-tuning. We first demonstrate that by ap-
propriately designing the learning rate schedule, our fine-tuning
approach could effectively remove the watermarks. We further
propose two techniques integrated into the REFIT framework, i.e.,
an adaption of the elastic weight consolidation (EWC) approach,
and unlabeled data augmentation (AU). We conduct an extensive
evaluation with the assumption of a weak adversary who only has
access to a limited amount of training data. Our results demonstrate
the effectiveness of REFIT against several watermarking schemes
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of different types. In particular, EWC and AU enable the adver-
sary to successfully remove the watermarks without causing much
degradation of the model performance. Furthermore, by leveraging
unlabeled data, the adversary could perform watermark removal
without any in-distribution labeled data, while achieving a much
better model performance than pruning, another general-purpose
watermark removal scheme agnostic to the watermark embedding
approaches. Our study highlights the vulnerability of existing wa-
termarking techniques, and we consider proposing more robust
watermarking techniques as future work.
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A MORE DISCUSSION ON EXPERIMENTAL
DETAILS
Our implementation is in PyTorch 2. For each watermarking scheme
in our evaluation, we present the best hyper-parameter configu-
rations in Table 7. Note that the adversary can always perform a
broader hyper-parameter sweep to select the best configuration,
seeking a desired trade-off between the performance degradation
and the extent to which the embedded watermarks are removed, as
described in Section 3.
2The implementation is mainly adapted from https://github.com/adiyoss/
WatermarkNN, the code repo of [1].
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Dataset Scheme Initial learning rate λ(EWC) m(AU)
CIFAR-10
Pattern 0.03 150 50
OOD [0.05, 0.15] 10 50
EW 0.03 20 50
AFS [0.01, 0.1] 3 [5, 50]
CIFAR-100
Pattern [0.03, 0.1] 20 50
OOD [0.03, 0.1] 200 50
EW [0.04, 0.05] [2, 5] 50
AFS [0.015, 0.07] [25, 30] [10, 50]
CIFAR-10→ STL-10
Pattern [0.03, 0.05] 10 50
OOD [0.04, 0.15] 10 50
EW [0.03, 0.05] 200 50
AFS [0.02, 0.05] 200 50
ImageNet32
Pattern [0.004, 0.04] [800, 1200] 50
OOD [0.005, 0.05] [30, 100] 50
EW [0.003, 0.1] [104, 2 × 104] 50
AFS [0.006, 0.03] [3, 50] [30, 50]
ImageNet32→ STL-10
Pattern [0.015, 0.02] [1000, 1100] 50
OOD [0.01, 0.015] [50, 100] 50
EW [0.007, 0.03] [1.2 × 104, 1.5 × 104] 50
AFS [0.003, 0.008] [200, 500] 50
Table 7: Range of hyper-parameters for all watermark removal results. λ denotes the coefficient in EWC andm is the number
of unlabeled samples added to a training batch with AU.
